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Abstract Global security concerns, acts of terrorism and organised crime
activity have motivated nation states to delve into implementing meas-
ures of mass surveillance in cyberspace, the breadth of which was partly
revealed by the whistleblower Edward Snowden. But are modern nation
states fighting a battle in the wrong space? Is mass surveillance of cyber-
space effective and are the conventional metaphors of technology control
appropriate for it? Can algorithms detect, classify and decide effectively
on what constitutes suspicious activity? We argue that as cyberspace is
a construct that has only recently been viewed strategically, let alone in-
doctrinated (the UKs cyber-security strategy is only four years old), the
societal impact of such bulk measures is yet much unclear – as are the as-
sumptions about the fitness of state organisations that are charged with
their oversight and the potential for unintended consequences. Recent
experiences highlight the role of multiple forms of intelligence inputs,
especially human- and community-based, and the need for application of
such intrusive measures in a targeted manner. We believe that intrusive
measures, where necessary, must be used decoupled from the seductive
promises of advanced technology and ought to go hand-in-hand with
means that strengthen the affected communities to identify, report and
battle extremism and organised crime, in ways that safeguard the fun-
damental principles of our contemporary democratic Western states.
Keywords: Surveillance, cyberspace, public trust
? This work has been supported in part by the European Commission through project
NIFTy (ISEC 2012 Action Grants HOME/2012/ISEC/INT/4000003892). The ideas
discussed appeared first as a talk at the Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society
conference in Cardiff in June 2015. They were subsequently refined into this paper
partly via serendipitous encounters enabled by the social medium of Twitter.
1 Introduction
In the fall of 2014, UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson submitted his report
on practices of mass surveillance by state actors and the threat that this ap-
proach to intelligence gathering poses to universal civil and political rights [1].
Emmerson called for open and transparent discussion between government and
citizens to inform and determine an appropriate balance between public security
and personal privacy. The Special Rapporteur pointed out that what is techno-
logically possible is not necessarily desirable or responsible. This is an argument
that surveillance scholars such as Kirstie Ball have been making for several years
now [2]. However, traction for this debate was limited until June 2013 when files
leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden were published in the Guardian
by journalist Glenn Greenwald [3].
Two years after the initial release of Snowden files, surveillance legislation
remains highly contested in Canada, the US and the UK. Perhaps most notably
is the sunsetting of section 215 of The Patriot Act and subsequent passing of
the USA FREEDOM Act5 in the United States in early June 2015 [4]. Days
later the Senate of Canada passed controversial anti-terrorism Bill C-516, which
would amend a number of other acts, as well as enact the Security of Canada
Information Sharing Act, receiving sustained public opposition from big busi-
ness, journalists, law professors, activists and the privacy commissioner [14]. A
week prior to these developments the latest rendition of the so called ‘snooper’s
charter’ in the UK was announced in the 2015 Queen’s Speech. Former deputy
Prime Minister Nick Clegg publicly opposed the legislation, currently known as
the Investigatory Powers Bill7, arguing it threatens the privacy rights of citizens.
Its details are not fully fledged yet at the time of writing, but it is expected to
be a contentious bill and Prime Minister David Cameron has at various points
pointed towards banning the use of strong encryption – albeit there would be
fierce opposition to legislation against it.
These measures are indicative of state attempts to curb terrorism threats by
enabling the development of surveillance capabilities that are of bulk collection
nature, rather than targeted to specific individuals. Proponents of these argue
that the proliferation of high technology, including anonymity, cryptography and
secure communication tools, enables organised crime and terrorists, extremists
etc. to communicate safely and go undetected. On the other hand privacy act-
ivists advocate the fundamental need for safe spaces to develop one’s ideas, the
human right to privacy and an individual’s need to protect themselves from ab-
usive regimes. There is thus a significant research – and national security – focus
on analysing and profiling digital and online behaviour [5,6].
Cyber security is thus emerging as one of the most challenging aspects of
the information age for policymakers, technologists and scholars of international
5 https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361
6 http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6932136&
Col=1&File=4
7 https://wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/Investigatory_Powers_Bill
relations. It has implications for national security, the economy, human rights,
civil liberties and international legal frameworks. Although politicians have been
aware of the threats of cyber insecurity since the early years of Internet techno-
logy, anxiety about the difficulties in resolving or addressing them has increased
rather than abated [7,8,12]. In response, governments have begun to develop ro-
bust (and wide-reaching) national cyber security strategies [9,10,11] to outline
the way in which they intend to address cyber insecurity. However, in many
states where critical infrastructure such as utilities, financial systems and trans-
port have been privatised, these policies are heavily reliant upon what is referred
to as the ‘public-private partnership’ as a key mechanism through which to mitig-
ate the threat. In the UK and US, the public-private partnership has repeatedly
been referred to as the ‘cornerstone’ or ‘hub’ of cyber security strategy [13],
which further raises questions regarding mass surveillance and data retention,
particularly who has access to private citizens’ data.
In this paper we develop an argument about the place of mass cyberspace
surveillance in society. We believe that deployment of intrusive systems on line,
where necessary, should be of clear and transparent purpose to the public and
accompanied by measures that empower the affected communities to tackle the
root causes of concern, e.g. radicalisation, hate speech etc. Drawing on analogies
from other surveillance systems we develop the idea of co-creation, in the civic
innovation sense of the term, arguing that otherwise Western states risk devel-
oping non-transparent and unaccountable structures of power that undermine
the fundamental values of their civilisation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides some further
background to the issue of mass surveillance of cyberspace with an emphasis
in the Anglo-Saxon West and discusses aspects of the Snowden leaks; section 3
develops some fundamental ideas and draws on analogies from other domains
to explore the difficulties and challenges involved; section 4 introduces our ideas
and policy recommendations for a system-of-systems approach and co-creation
of intrusive technologies; and finally we conclude with an overview section 5.
2 Background
The debate on mass surveillance, which is comprised of several threads, has
engaged a range of social groups including politicians, law makers, journalists,
academics, tech firms, activists, artists and the general public. The term mass
surveillance is used to distinguish the bulk collection of data from targeted sur-
veillance, which typically involves a ‘person of interest’. Central to this aspect of
the debate is the legal warrant, which is traditionally issued upon satisfaction of
a certain level of suspicion. In the case of Canada, for example, Bill C-13, which
was passed in the fall of 2014, significantly lowered the level of suspicion required
to justify the collection of personal data. Bill C-13 also addressed the distinc-
tion between data and meta data, which is a hotly debated topic in surveillance
legislation. In particular, Bill C-13 reduces the limitations on collecting meta
data under the guise that it is not intrusive. Advocates of expanded surveillance
powers for the state have attempted to mollify concerns by arguing that meta
data does not threaten the political or civil rights of citizens because it is data
about communication and not the content of communication. This argument has
been routinely problematized by opponents who point out that metadata can
reveal religious beliefs, political leanings and intimate relationships. Moreover,
meta data is used by state actors to kill people, as was famously announced by
former NSA and CIA director Michael Hayden [15].
As legislation governing surveillance practices in Western society continues
to evolve, a related debate is emerging. In early June, UN Special Rapporteur
David Kaye submitted his report on the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion [16]. Kaye argued that encryption and anonymity in digital communications
is fundamental for the preservation of privacy and the protection of opinion and
belief. The Special Rapporteur framed encrypted communication as a tool for
citizens to protect their human rights from infringement by government agen-
cies. Moreover, he called for the mobilization of state resources to ensure all
individuals using digital communication can do so with encryption. Just prior to
the release of the report, Nico Sell, co-founder of leading encrypted messaging
app Wickr8, launched a non-profit organization with this goal in mind.
However, less popular apps like Wickr and more mainstream social network-
ing services like WhatsApp and Snapchat are being targeted by governments. In
January 2015, UK Prime Minister David Cameron publicly announced his in-
tention to ban communications that are not accessible by government agencies.
Cameron asked for and quickly received support for this position from President
Obama. The movement to ban encryption points towards the criminalization
of private communication, which would threaten a variety of political, civil and
human rights. Moreover, security experts have noted that weakening commu-
nication by demanding back door access will increase vulnerabilities and by
extension could compromise national security. In May 2015, over 140 technology
firms, including Apple, Google and Symantec, sent an open letter9 to President
Obama urging him not to push for government access to encrypted communica-
tion. In the meantime, apps that offer individuals encrypted communication are
proliferating as concern for privacy in mainstream society climbs.
The Snowden leaks revealed a wide portfolio of projects and initiatives both
from the NSA in the US, CSIS in Canada and GCHQ in the UK. These range
from specific data collection projects such as Optic Nerve, aimed at Yahoo! web-
cam traffic (Figure 1), to influencing the development of cryptographic standards
to contain vulnerabilities, so they can be penetrated easier [17]. In this varied
context the Anderson report [18] that was released recently as a comprehens-
ive review of the UK’s capabilities and practice prior to revamping the existing
legislation, emphasised a number of issues, amongst the most important - and
8 https://www.wickr.com/
9 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
tech-giants-urge-obama-to-resist-backdoors-into-encrypted-communications/
2015/05/18/11781b4a-fd69-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html
Figure 1. Yahoo! webcam traffic monitoring report snapshots from Snowden’s cache.
contested - of which, was the suggestion for judicial rather than ministerial over-
sight.
Politicians have already started countering the suggestion by claiming that
despite the wide and varied nature of operations, ministers can have more top-
ical information than judges and make decisions quicker, as opposed to going
through the overheads of a judiciary procedure. However, due to the wide reach
of operations it is questionable how much in depth understanding can law makers
develop in the short amounts of time to decide in the absence of a transparent
and well defined process. Another interesting point raised after the leaks is about
the level of access and trust vested to a third-party, private contractor by se-
curity services, which may be indicative of the lack of resourcing of the relevant
agencies – and adding to the need for sufficient oversight.
3 Developing public understanding of surveillance in the
context of cyberspace
3.1 Deconstructing state imagery of cyber surveillance
Politicians use many metaphors and analogies to promote the idea of cyberspace
surveillance among the public. David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, talked
in early 2015 about the need for the state to be able to eavesdrop digital com-
munications over the Internet, just as it can happen over the telephony network.
Drawing on analogies between the more familiar phone technology and the pub-
lic’s understanding of a legitimate wire-tapping process, he tried to construct an
image of accepted mass surveillance.
Another frequently used analogy is the case of the closed-circuit television
(CCTV) surveillance systems. This is a familiar, and very tangible, system
which in the UK at least enjoys large amounts of public tolerance and even
approval [19], even at the face of lack of real evidence of its effectiveness [20]. We
will get back to this a bit later, discussing the experience of institutionalisation
of CCTV as a means of surveillance, particularly in the UK where it is widely
deployed across the country.
Security services in turn have played a role in constructing further the pop-
ular image of surveillance in cyberspace. Firstly, they persist in disassociating
bulk collection from mass surveillance and differentiating between metadata and
content. This is an attempt to legitimise operations based by necessity on a wide
scan surface dictated by the complex, interconnected nature of the Internet. In
his valedictory speech at the Cabinet War Room on 21 Oct 2014, Sir Iain Lob-
ban, previous head of GCHQ, having just assured that, of the huge volumes of
information trafficked on-line, GCHQ were able to capture, store and process
only a tiny amount, he went on to say:
“We access the internet at scale so as to dissect it with surgical precision. Prac-
tically, it is now impossible to operate successfully in any other way. You can’t
pick and choose the components of a global interception system that you like
(catching terrorists and paedophiles), and those you don’t (incidental collection
of data at scale): it’s one integrated system.” [21]
This reinforces the view of cyberspace surveillance as a wide surface scanning
process (a Panopticon, as envisaged by Bentham in Figure 2) followed by a
clinical application of targeted algorithmics that would be able to pave the way
for the more targeted content analysis by real people. The focus on metadata,
bulk collection and automated processing before reasonable suspicion has been
raised for a human to intervene, constructs an argument about this practice not
constituting surveillance, in the sense of its warranted and targeted application.
Whether the Panopticon metaphor matches the underlying security require-
ments is a significant question. This is because a metaphor is a conceptual con-
struct able to shape action, as demonstrated by several scholars, including e.g.
Tsoukas [22]. Very soon after the attacks of 9/11, Lackoff argued that inappro-
priately framing the reaction as a ‘war on terror’ would produce unintended
consequences [23]. Other research shows how secure systems implementation is
shaped by the dominant security metaphors in use within organisations [24].
The Panopticon metaphor imposes the surveillance burden upon everyone,
whether they are watched or not. This usually creates fundamental mistrust
among many quarters of society towards government and the security services.
But even viewed as bulk collection, it implies a huge sifting load for them. The
report excerpts of Figure 1 demonstrate how the signal to noise ratio increases
with bulk collection. The OPTIC NERVE programme was riddled with footage
of genitals and posed significant challenges to intelligence officers as of how to
handle the situation.
But the ‘clinical’ perception of the algorithmic component is problematic
as well. Just as errors in human judgement may lead to tragic outcomes such
as the shooting of Brazilian citizen Charles de Menezes in London by police
in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks, similarly algorithms may equally fail (the
Figure 2. Part of Jeremy Bentham’s designs for a Panopticon prison.
headline of Figure 3 is indicative of such a failure). In fact the absence of human
judgement may cause this aspect to be perceived as even more untrustworthy.
Another implicit assumption to legitimise this view is that this activity is or-
ganised under a framework of strong oversight. Particularly for the Anglo-Saxon
world and especially for the UK, in the light of the strong leadership of promin-
ent politicians such as Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair,
this assurance is almost taken for granted. However, history suggests that in the
absence of oversight, socio-political circumstances may provide opportunity for
exploitation of such structures. The experience of the rise of the Nazi party in
the Weimar Republic is in line with this observation. Finally, we often also forget
that the Internet is in reality a young technological development that it is yet
much unexplored in terms of national security and military doctrine and use; for
example, the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy is less than five years old [10].
3.2 Personal attitudes and the personal data dimension
An interesting dimension of surveillance in cyberspace comes from the personal
attitudes of the general public towards intrusive technology and its take up. Most
Figure 3. Failures of algorithmic determination after the Boston bombings.
recent disruptive innovations such as social networking platforms and wearable
technologies are in fact privacy-intrusive by design. Computational paradigms
that are based on the Cloud utilise lightweight computational intelligence of
embedded systems and devices and harness the power of on-line servers to process
large amounts of personal data. This ‘commoditization’ of personal data happens
on the trade off of personal service provision (e.g. wayfinding) in return for
targeted advertising or aggregated consumer behaviour insight development that
is then cashed in by the service provider, e.g. the GoogleAds model [25].
Despite the fact that providers of services such as Google and Facebook
usually operate in multi-jurisdictions, which make difficult a coherent legislative
approach and leave a lot of issues with respect to protection of personal data,
there is a huge take up of their services. It seems that the personal value realised
for each user, combined with the unclear implications/risks to the individual
from their use have contributed largely to this. This is despite general concerns
of legislators for their operation, as in the case of Belgium that investigated
Facebook tracking of users, even when not logged in [26]. Also despite journalists
and researchers have flagged how both in terms of practicalities such as extended
data retention periods (e.g. [27]), but also how theoretically can be shown that
providers tend to maximise their payoffs when they misuse personal data [28].
We argue that one of the side effects of this is the casualisation of attitudes
towards privacy rights. There is a creeping indifference that could develop to
passive acceptance through repeated interaction and use of such technologies
– in a way that Giddens describes as routinisation in his theory of structura-
tion [29]. However, familiarity with people giving up personal data in return for
real value should not necessarily be viewed negatively in the context of cyber
surveillance. We will argue in the following section that such relationship can be
at the centre of the creation of new surveillance systems, built upon consensus
where intelligence is necessary and there is clear understanding of its value to
all stakeholders.
4 Co-creating viable surveillance systems
We referred earlier to CCTV as an example of a surveillance technology that has
been relatively successful, from a technology acceptance and use point of view.
That is particularly apparent in the UK, where it is estimated that there are
over 4 million cameras in operation, although police investigations suggest that
this may be an over-estimation [30]. It is interesting to note that CCTV overall
is really a collection of ad hoc installations of security cameras that offer access
to footage of varying quality. These include public spaces monitoring as well as
private surveillance systems for both corporate and personal property.
In reality CCTV is a system-of-systems that has emerged out of societal con-
sent and adds some value (mostly evidential) to the law enforcement process. It
is not standardised in terms of technical configurations or modes of operation,
but of course its use is regulated, as personal data protection legislation applies.
Notices of CCTV enforcement are for example mandatory to be displayed at
the physical spaces that are monitored. Operators are also obliged to obfus-
cate streams that may be intrusive of personal space that could be accidentally
included in the footage, e.g. certain frames that capture nearby windows. In
Canada individuals may also be blocked out if they are in the frame and not
directly relevant to an investigation. And in order to build public confidence, sev-
eral operation centres in cities, such as traffic controllers, would include in their
governance structures some involvement of members of the public, or elected
local councillors.
Regardless of the heated debate about the effectiveness of CCTV against
crime [19,20], its proliferation and acceptance in some societies is notable. This
is certainly the case in the UK, where CCTV rose to public prominence largely
in the 80’s. Part of its take up may be due to the campaign against football
hooliganism as well as ground safety fears after the tragedy of Hillsborough. Some
researchers also suggest that they became instruments of enforcing an image of
a tough stance against crime by political parties, especially New Labour [31].
The simplicity of purpose of a video surveillance system and the ability to
relate its operation to a societal challenge (in this case football violence and pub-
lic safety in grounds) established the technology in the collective social mind as
something intrusive, yet necessary. This facilitated take up across public spaces
of local councils (e.g. car parks), motorways, even on board means of transport,
as well as in private businesses and buildings. Market forces and accessibility to
the technology enabled everyone that may have had interest in it to install and
operate such systems, creating space for the general public to serve as co-creators
of the overall CCTV system-of-systems.
Translating this into the cyber domain, there is a need for related technology
to be viewed as an enabler, as opposed to being demonised and fundamentally
mistrusted. Greater transparency of Internet surveillance programmes and suf-
ficient oversight structures would assure the public of the role of technology.
Further education and public understanding of surveillance would help. This is
not incompatible with the secrecy that security services claim must surround
their operations; in fact they ought to assume that adversaries are suspicious
of their practices. The Panopticon metaphor needs to be revisited as until now
it has blurred the realisation of the need to intervene earlier in the radicalisa-
tion lifecycle to debunk their propaganda messages and the appeal of radicalism
to young and vulnerable members of society. There is a need for more human-
centric intelligence, open source and targeted operations, as opposed to passive
monitoring and algorithmic determination implied by the current paradigm. We
believe that if the purpose is clear and the community is able to see the value
to them, they will even tolerate the trade off of personal data in return for con-
fronting effectively this threat, as suggested even by the commercial experiences
discussed earlier.
5 Conclusions
In light of global security challenges that include radicalisation and terrorism,
but also increasing use of high technology by organised transnational crime, it is
tempting for national states and their security services to develop mass surveil-
lance programmes. The seductive promise of technological capability however,
may not be a solution that is as relevant as human centric intelligence, as both
wide surface scanning and artificial intelligence face their challenges as we have
argued. And in any case this kind of capability is retrospective and missing
the crucial stage of early intervention at the root cause of phenomena such as
radicalisation of young persons to jihadist ideologies.
Creating powerful capabilities with insufficient oversight increases the po-
tential for abuse of power and risks the loss of confidence and support from the
wider public. This is exactly one of the aims of dissident groups and so we believe
that organised states should refrain from developing surveillance capabilities in
absentia of their key stakeholders, particularly the wider public. It is only with
public trust that these may be successfully deployed. It is also essential that the
paradigm of their development is one of a system-of-systems, i.e. viewed as an
integral part of the wider state capability for countering terrorism and other or-
ganised crime. The whole picture ought to include early intervention to counter
and debunk the appealing propaganda of terror groups and also to enable af-
fected communities to report to, and cooperate with, the relevant authorities in
confidence.
It is tempting for security services to explore every avenue of technology to
counter such a severe threat. But the resulting programmes ought to respect
fundamental rights of Western democracies, operate under strict due diligence
and be accepted by the public, much like the example of CCTV in Britain. For,
if the state in the process creates inadvertently the Matrix, it ought to be aware
that the next historic revolution may come exactly from within it.
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